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LAWYER-POLITICIANS IN NEW ENGLAND:
AN OVERVIEW OF POLITICS AND
PRACTICES
CLYDE

D.

McKEE, JR.*

INTRODUCTION

Life and law must be kept
closely in touch, as you
can't adjust life to law
you must adjust law to
life.
The only point in having law
is to make life work.
Otherwise there will be
explosions. I
-Arnold Toynbee

The practice of law and the practice of politics are both compat
ible and incompatible. This paradox is illustrated by the life of
Daniel Webster, one of this nation's most famous and influential
lawyers. John F. Kennedy, in his Profiles In Courage, wrote,
"Daniel Webster is familiar to many of us as the battler for Jabez
Stone's soul against the devil in Stephen Vincent Benet's story. But
in his own life time, he had many battles against the devil for his
own soul-and some he lost."2
• Associate Professor of Political Science, Trinity College, Hartford Connecticut;
Past President, American Society for Public Administration, Connecticut Chapter; Past
Chairman, New England Regional Conference of ASPA; Member, Executive Council of
The New England Political Science Association; Author of PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE
LEGISLATURE: THE CONNECTICUT GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1980); Author of CONNECTI
CUT, A POLITICAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION, NEW ENGLAND POLITICAL PARTIES (1983);
Dr. McKee has also written more than two dozen articles and professional papers dealing
with state and local politics in New England. Valuable assistance in the preparation of
this article was given by Robert Salad, a third-year law student at Western New England
College School of Law and a Senior Staff Member of the Western New England Law
Review, and Elaine J. Garrahy, Secretary for the Political Science Department at Trinity
College.
I. J. BRAUDE, COMPLETE SPEAKER'S AND TOASTMASTER'S LIBRARY, REMARKS OF
FAMOUS PEOPLE 59 (1965).
2. J. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 53 (Giant Cardinal ed. 1960).
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Kennedy described Webster as "undoubtedly the most talented
figure in our Congressional history,"3 but he also wrote that he "was
not as great as he 100ked."4 He could see nothing improper in writ
ing to the President of the Bank of the United States-at the very
time when the Senate was engaged in debate over a renewal of the
Bank's Charter-noting that "my retainer has not been received or
refreshed as usual."5 Although lawyers can take pride in the fact
that the ethical standards of the legal profession have progressed sig
nificantly since Chief Justice John Marshall delivered Marbury v.
Madison ,6 lawyer-politicians still have serious problems related to
conflicts of interest. The devil-battling dilemma-to identify the line
separating proper legal conduct from improper conduct and to pre
vent political opportunities from forcing the lawyer to cross it-·is as
real today as it was nearly two centuries ago.
Robert Leuci, the former New York City policeman who in
spired the movie Prince of the City, accused New York's lawyers,
prosecutors, and judges, of corruption. In a presentation at Western
New England College School of Law he warned law students: "An
erosion process begins that attacks your integrity, your morality.
Many times you're going to have to make decisions about what you
are and who you are."7
This article has several objectives. First, it will show the affinity
between the practice of law and politics. Next, it will use three New
England states-Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts-to
describe opportunities for lawyers who are also interested in politics.
Attention will be given to the Code of Professional Responsibility of
the American Bar Association, the conflicts of interest statutes in
three states, and how these laws and the opinions of bar associations
and ethics commissions have influenced the policies of law firms
serving these areas. The closing section is designed for those inter
ested in improving legal ethics or making law and politics more
compatible.
I.

THE AFFINITY BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS

Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth century French aristocrat
who perceptively analyzed the political culture of the United States,
3.
4.

Id
Id at 54.
5. Id at 54-55.
6. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7. LeVick, Ex-police Corruption Figure Warns of Erosion of Morals, The Hartford
Courant, Jan. 20, 1983, at 42.
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wrote, "If I were asked where I place the American aristocracy, I
sh'ould reply without hesitation . . . that it occupies the judicial
bench and the bar . . . scarcely any political question arises in the
United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
question."8 One of the earliest examples of both the affinity of law
and politics and the lawyer as aristocrat is found in the metamorpho
sis of Connecticut from plantation to colony.9 Trinity College Pro
fessor Glenn Weaver observed that Connecticut's Fundamental
Orders "was largely the work of Roger Ludlow of Windsor, the only
man in the river towns with training in law."10
Stimson Bullitt, author of To Be a Politician, II is a lawyer-poli
tician, who twice ran for Congress. Bullitt further illustrated de Toc
queville's insight when he wrote,
. . . if politics is one's main interest, law is a good home base.
Although this factor is overrated, a legal background is a help in
the performance of a politician's job because the work experience
of a lawyer, even a specialist, covers such a wide variety of knowl
edge in his community.12

Bullitt also saw law as "a castle which one can leave for a venture in
politics."13 He quotes Henry Stimson, who spent many years mov
ing from the practice of law to the service of national government
and then back to law, "I always felt that I remained a lawyer with a
law firm waiting as a home behind me, to which I could return on
the completion of my public task and where I could always find
awaiting my genial friends and collaborators in the law."14 But Bul
litt saw, in his own practice of law and politics, the same dangers that
confronted Daniel Webster. 15 Interviews by the author with young
and old lawyers, political reporters, legislative administrators, and'
those responsible for policing legal practices and advising lawyers
revealed that the problems faced by the New England lawyer who
engages in politics both directly and indirectly are enduring and fre
8,
9.

I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 278, 280 (1945).
G. WEAVER, AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CONNECTICUT'S CAPITAL 18 (1982).
10. Id. at 19. Historian John Fiske called the Fundamental Orders, which Con
necticut claims as its initial constitution, "the first written constitution known to history
that created a government" and wrote that "it marked the beginning of American democ
racy." CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER 53 (1982).
II. S. BULLITT, To BE A POLITICIAN 13 (1977).
12. Id. at 13.

13. Id.
14. Id. at 13-14.
15. Id.
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quently monumental. I6
II.

POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES: WHERE "THE PLUMS" ARE IN
CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND AND MASSACHUSETTS

Although the author has been a student of New England's state
and local governments for the past two decades, the diversity of op
portunities for lawyer-politicians in the New England states came as
a surprise. Because the political cultures of such states as Connecti
cut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts are different, the ways lawyers
engage in politics are also different.
A.

Connecticut

Just as a lawyer drafted Connecticut's Fundamental Orders in
1639, it was Harvard-educated lawyer John M. Bailey who was "the
architect of modern Connecticut politics."17 Superior Court Judge
Robert Satter, who experienced many phases of the Connecticut
lawyer-politician as a local party leader, state legislator, counsel for
the Democratic Party, and judge, has valuable insights into both
Connecticut's political culture and the role lawyers have played
within this culture. 18 Satter shows the way in which lawyer-politi
cian Bailey dominated Connecticut politics during the period 1946
1975, masterminding the election of six Democratic governors in
nine elections. 19 As a local (Hartford), state, and national Demo
cratic Party chairman (appointed by President Kennedy in 1960),
Bailey had tremendous influence in the selection of Connecticut's
judges, prosecutors, clerks, and even the court staff. Bailey had two
16. During the period of October 1982 to January 1983, the author interviewed,
either in person or by telephone lawyers, reporters, lobbyists, researchers, prosecutors,
and the heads of ethics commissions. Some of the lawyers were just beginning their
careers as attorneys and politicians while others were senior partners on the executive
committees of major law firms. Although the author would like to give credit to these
individuals for their contributions to this article, in nearly all instances there was a re
quest for confidentiality as a condition for candid information.
17. Satter, Hero Worship and the State We're In, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 9,
1983, at 9.
18. Robert Satter is a superior court judge in Connecticut who has had comprehen
sive experience as a lawyer-politician. He began his career in private practice, served in
the Connecticut General Assembly as a member of the House for three terms, held the
position of Legislative Counsel for the Democratic Party for eight years at a time when
the Democrats controlled the office of governor and both houses of the legislature, and
was appointed a state judge in 1975. He is also an adjunct professor at the University of
Connecticut Law School.
19. Satter, The Role ojthe Legislative Counsel, in PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE LEGIS
LATURE 33-40 (c. McKee, Jr., ed. 1980).
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cornerstones for his political influence. First, he had an understand
ing with all his Democratic governors that there would be a division
of authority: the governor would run the state, and Bailey would
run the party and the patronage system. Second, Bailey, an expert in
the legislative process, controlled the state senate, which he used to
block unwanted legislative initiatives. 20 Satter describes how Bailey
used the promise of a judgeship to motivate his service to Connecti
cut: "Bailey lived to see Ella elected and inaugurated. And one of
his final acts was to fulfill his promise to me by calling Governor
Grasso from his hospital bed, when he could hardly speak, to have
my name put on the list of prospective judges."21 But when John
Bailey and Governor Grasso died, a new political system evolved in
Connecticut. As the incentives and rewards system shifted, the op
portunities for lawyer-politicians also changed.
Connecticut's political system is becoming democratized,
professionalized, and, in some areas, nonpartisanized. What this
means is that lawyers can now use the state's challenge primary law
to make direct runs for office with or without the endorsement of
party chairman. They can create their own campaign organizations,
raise their own funds, get their own supporters to the voting ma
chines, and let the people decide. If elected, they are relatively free
to establish their own political priorities and to use personal discre
tion in selecting staff. Because the governor nominates lawyers for
judgeships, however, and the judiciary committee (Connecticut uses
a joint-committee system) screens and approves them, the governor
and the party's legislative leaders still have significant influence over
those who aspire to positions within the judiciary.22 One lobbyist,
who is not a lawyer, but who served several terms as a state legisla-.
tor, complained bitterly about this motivating feature. He said, "At
torneys in the legislature are asked to 'check their brains' if they
want to be judges. I think it is dangerous to require that judges be
lawyers."23 The trend in Connecticut, however, is towards a more
professionalization and greater certification.
Connecticut's General Assembly is a mixture of patronage and
merit appointments. The personal staff of majority and minority
20. See C.D. McKEE, JR., Constitutional Principles and Strategies for Controlling
the Authority of the State, in PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE LEGISLATURE 3-13 (1980).
21. Satter, Hero Worship and The State We're In, in PERSPECTIVES OF A STATE
LEGISLATURE 16 (C. McKee, Jr. ed. 1980).
22. See C.D. McKEE, JR., Connecticut: A Political System in Transition, in NEW
ENGLAND POLITICAL PARTIES (1983).
23. See supra note 16.
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leaders, plus the clerks of committees, are appointed on the basis of
personal and party loyalty and service. But partisan affiliation can
be a handicap for those lawyers seeking positions within the research
components of the legislature. Numerous attorneys are hired on the
basis of their legal qualifications rather than party connections.
Similarly, Connecticut's 112 state prosecutors are becoming less
partisan. They are selected by senior resident judges in each of Con
necticut's twelve judicial districts rather than by the attorney general
or the legislature. 24 Connecticut's seventeen part-time assistant pros
ecutors are being phased out. The entry level salaries for deputy
assistant state's attorneys is $26,000, which is more than most private
law firms pay for inexperienced associates. The path to one of these
positions is often through a clerkship for a senior judge rather than
through service to a party chairman or candidate for elected office.
The erosion of an "incentive-rewards" system within the major par
ties has contributed to the decline in their influence in Connecticut.
Some of the best opportunities for lawyer-politicians in Con
necticut are at the local level. Near the top is the elected position of
probate judge. There are 131 probate judges, each with a four-year
term. Although the requirements for these judgeships are political
rather than legal (judges do not have to be lawyers), probate judges
who are attorneys have considerable advantages. They can engage
in civil and criminal private law practice. Their time is flexible.
They have high public visibility. Additionally, they can build a net
work of valuable relationships using their authority to appoint exec
utors of estates. Probate judgeships are highly stable in that
incumbents are usually re-elected. In recent years, the probate court
system has come under strong attack for improprieties, however, by
The Hariford Courant, Connecticut's largest newspaper. 25
Town counselor director of law is a position that has many of
the same benefits as probate judge. Most are part-time jobs, with
flexible schedules, few restrictions on criminal or civil practice, and
high public visibility. The disadvantages are that these attorneys are
usually appointed by chief executives, and the positions have no
fixed terms, and less stability than probate judges. Also, there is a
24. See supra note 16. Newly-elected Attorney General Joseph Lieberman cam
paigned to change this provision of the Connecticut Constitution. He wants his office to
have both civil and criminal jurisdiction with control over the Chief State's Attorney,
who is now appointed by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Hartford Cou
rant, July 17, 1983 at B5.
25. See, e.g., The Hartford Courant, April 14, 1983, at I.
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trend in some larger cities to remove directors of law from partisan
politics and to make them full-time, civil service positions.
Some young attorneys seek appointments as counsel for various
boards, commissions, and committees. Particularly attractive is
counsel for the zoning board, hospital board, or economic develop
ment committee. While these appointments have relatively low visi
bility, little stability, and limited financial rewards, they offer the
young lawyer-politician valuable opportunities for knowledge and
expenence.
The main attraction for Connecticut lawyers to serve on parti
san committees at the state and local levels is the opportunity to de
velop relationships with partisan decision-makers, while running few
conflicts-of-interest risks that restrict private practice. Similarly,
lawyers who serve as campaign managers for prominent candidates
have additional incentives and advantages. A campaign manager
has a variety of opportunities to develop valuable contacts with the
heads of organizations in both the public and the private sectors.
Compared to serving a term of office as an elected or appointed offi
cial, the period of commitment for a campaign manager is relatively
short. Because the personal relationship between the candidate and
his or her manager is often highly personal and frequently intense,
there is the opportunity for an enduring friendship. If the state party
chairman is relatively weak and the candidate is an incumbent gov
ernor, the lawyer-campaign manager can become one of the most
influential figures in the entire state political system without incur
ring the responsibilities or restrictions on legal practice that are asso
ciated with public office. Also, there is widespread perception that
this lawyer has political influence when practicing before state agen
cies even though actual influence does not exist.

B. Rhode Island
Lincoln Steffens in 1905 called Rhode Island "a state for sale."26
Duane Lockard, a political scientist at Connecticut College in 1958,
attempted to explain why this state has a reputation for being politi
cally corrupt.27 First, he stressed the fact that Rhode Island was a
one-party Republican state until 1932, when it abruptly went Demo
cratic. There was considerable corruption under the Republican re
26. Steffens, Rhode Islanti: A Slale For Sale, 24 MCCLURE'S MAG., 337 (Feb.
1905). See also D. LOCKARD, NEW ENGLAND STATE POLITICS 172 (1959).
27. LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 172.
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gime which established a tradition that the Democrats continued. 28
Next, Lockard stressed the fact that Rhode Island is one of the most
urbanized states, with half of the population engaged in manufactur
ing. Equally important was the fact that Rhode Island had "a higher
proportion of immigrants and their second- and third-generation
progeny than any other state."29
Lawyers were very much part of the system Lockard described.
Republican "boss" Charles Brayton, a civil war general, controlled
the state legislature and all appointments. 30 Lincoln Steffens ob
served that Brayton controlled Rhode Island's lawyer-legislators by
using judgeships and law business as incentives and rewards. 31 Con
tributing to the tradition of political corruption, was the practice of
dual office holding, whereby legislators could accept executive ap
pointments. There was also the linkage between lawyer-legislators
and the race-tracks.
The majority leader of the House, James H. Kiernan, has for
many years been an attorney for one of the race tracks. One can
not conclude from this fact alone that the actions of the majority
leader on race-track issues are influenced thereby, but at the very
least there would seem to be a serious conflict of interest. 32

Interviews with lawyers, reporters, and state civil employees re
vealed that although the state has adopted a variety of reforms it still
has "a different political culture."33 What this means is that while
Massachusetts pays its state legislators $30,000 per year and Con
necticut pays its part-time, "citizen" legislators $10,500 and $2,500
expenses, Rhode Island still has a constitutional provision for paying
its legislators $300 per year for its short (60 days), four-day week
sessions. Yet many of the 150 legislators, representing 39 communi
ties, are lawyers. 34 To illustrate, the chart below reveals that attor
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. According to Lockard, in 1901 Rhode Island passed "The Brayton Law", a
procedure authorizing the Senate to reject a governor's nomination fo! any office and
then to substitute its own candidate. Without authority to veto, the governor was without
the power usurped by Brayton as party boss. Id. at 175.
31. Id. (citing L. STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS 466
(1931».
32. LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 209-10.
33. This was the phrase used by a state career administrator, who has lived in
Rhode Island most of his life and is familiar with the politics of the other New England
states. Id.
34. Id.
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ney-Iegislators for the past decade have dominated both the House
and Senate judiciary committees.
House and Senate Judiciary Committees Membershi p 35
House
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82

Senate
1973-74
1975-76
1977-78
1979-80
1981-82

No. of Members

No. of Attorneys

17
16
17
17
17

9
8
9
8
6

No. of Members

No. of Attorneys

17
15
18
18
16

II
9
7
9
12

Rhode Island's structure resembles that of a city-state largely
because, like Connecticut, it has no county government. This means
that lawyer-politicians play influential roles at the local levels. 36
There are 39 probate judges and an equal number of city solicitors,
who are part-timers free to engage in both civil and criminal prac
tice. Unlike Connecticut's system, both probate judges and city so
licitors are appointed by the city councils. This means there are
incentives for lawyers to run for council seats from which they can
control judicial appointments or advance their own legal-political
careers. 37 It does not seem that the political culture which Lincoln
Steffens described in 1905 and Lockard analyzed in 1958 has
changed significantly in Rhode Island. There seems to be considera
ble acceptance of apparent, if not actual, conflicts of interest by law
yer-politicians at both the state and locallevels. 38
C. Massachusetts
Politics in Massachusetts is "big league hard ball" played by
committed and often talented professionals. Tradition runs deep
and permeates public institutions at both the state and local levels.
35. Letter from Eileen Cook to Dr. Clyde D. McKee, Jr. (Jan. 25, 1983). This table
was constructed by researchers in the Legislative Council on January 25, 1983. Id
36. See supra note 16.
37. Id
38. Id
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National, state and local officials have statures and reputations
greater than those in many other states. Obvious are the examples of
Senator Kennedy and House Speaker O'Neill. Whereas Connecticut
and Rhode Island have traditions for part-time, citizen-politicians,
who are paid meager salaries, Massachusetts has the tradition for
full-time office holders, who are adequately compensated. 39
There is a Brahmin factor in Massachusetts politics which influ
ences lawyer-politicians. "[I]n some states, family names do not
mean a great deal; in others, first family, blueblood status has great
political influence. Probably none of these privileged groups has so
conspicuous or well-heralded a place as the Boston Brahmins."4o
The prominence and influence of politically active, old-line families
has tended to keep political parties weak while contributing to the
legitimacy and the honor of public service for lawyers in the Com
monwealth. Lockard saw this when he wrote, "The General Court
has an air of importance and decorum about it that resembles Con
gress or the House of Commons more than other state legisla
tures."41 Lawyers considering practice in Massachusetts are
confronted with clearer choices than is usually the case in Connecti
cut or in Rhode Island.
On the one hand, there is the attraction of the large and prestigi
ous, downtown Boston law firms. Salaries start at about $35,000 and
within six or seven years there is an expectation of $70,000-$90,000. 42
On the other hand, there are the political offices. Near the top of the
list are the ten district attorneys, who are elected for four-year terms
and who serve as county prosecutors. In addition to having high
public visibility and substantial authority to appoint assistant prose
cutors, the office of district attorney can be viewed as an excellent
location from which to launch a campaign for state-wide office or
Congress. It may also serve as a fine reentry point into private crimi
nal practice. Lawyers who fail to gain appointment with one of the
big Boston firms will sometimes use positions within the attorney
general's office to gain the specialized experiences and reputations
they need to win prestigious appointments within the private sector
on the second attempt. 43
At the local level there are strong incentives for some lawyers to
39.

Id

LOCKARD, supra note 26, at 119.
Id at 148.
42. This information was supplied by a young Harvard-educated lawyer, who left
one of these firms for an appointment at the state capitol. See supra note 16.
43. Id

40.
41.
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engage in politics to gain advantages in the practice of law. One
young attorney explained how being a state representative can help
in the practice of law in a local court.
State representatives get to know the local judge. They also know
their way around the court. They know when the calendar of
cases is backed up. Timing can be a major factor in the practice of
law. With a continuance, a lawyer can often work out a deal with
the other side to the advantage of his client. 44

Similarly, a state representative enjoys an advantage in repre
senting a client who has legislative matters of interest. This is be
cause the representative clearly enjoys access to state government
which is of great value to the client, to the extent the access may be
properly used. 45
III.

A.

THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST REFORM MOVEMENT

National Guidelines ani'Disciplinary Rules

On August 12, 1969, the Code of Professional Responsibility
was adopted as a model of ethical conduct for the nation's attor
neys.46 The American Bar Association's Special Committee on
Evaluation of Ethical Standards was appointed to evaluate the Ca
nons of Professional Ethics, which were first promulgated in 1908.
The committee identified four shortcomings of the Canons. 47 In
cluded in the shortcomings, was the need to update the Canons to
keep pace with the changing conditions of our legal system in an
urbanized society.48
Recently the Code of Professional Responsibility has become a
source of concern both from within and outside the bar.49 Height
ened public criticism of legal ethics in the post-Watergate years has
helped fuel reform movements. In response, the ABA appointed the
Special Commission for the Evaluation of Professional Standards on
August 22, 1977, to review the need for improving the Code. 50 The
new code is currently in the form of a restatement. 51
44. Id
45. Id
46. See generally Reflections on a Decade Under the Code of Professional Responsi
bility: The Needfor Riform, 57 N.C. L. REV. 495 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Reflections).
47. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preface (1979).
48. Id
49. Reflections, supra note 47, at 495.
50. Id
51. Id at 495-96.
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While the present Code leaves wide latitude for state and fed
eral discretion concerning conflicts of interest arising when a lawyer
is also a public office holder, some policy considerations are mani
fested by the Code. 52 These considerations and the applicable Disci
plinary Rules and Ethical Considerations will be outlined before an
analysis is made. Clearly, society benefits by having lawyers serve as
public officers. 53 One ethical consideration provides that lawyers are
uniquely qualified to make significant contribution in improving the
legal system. 54 This provision serves also as a warning to public of
ficeholders to refrain from engaging in activities which are, or for
see ably could be, in conflict with their official duties as lawyers. 55
An attorney who holds public office must avoid conduct which
could lead a lay person to conclude that the attorney is using his
office to further his professional success or personal interest. 56 More
over, such an attorney knows that his conduct is not in the public
interest. 57 Finally, DR 8-101 (A)(2) prohibits an office-holding attor
ney from using his position to influence or attempting to influence a
tribunal to take action in his or his client's favor. 58
The code provisions cited above serve as an outline, albeit a
general one, for attorneys to follow. Courts have similarly genera
lized when and how these provisions should be applied. The New
Jersey Supreme Court in applying DR 8-101(A)(2) stated that: "The
touchstone of our disciplinary power is to fashion a sanction which
fulfills our trust to the public and the profession, edifies the bar and
is fair and just to the respondent."59
One writer 60 commented that, while DR 8-101(A)(1) is a worth
while and necessary proscription for certain conduct by lawyers who
are also public officials, it is also an "unrealistic and unenforceable"
provision. 61 This is so because the lawyer must use discretion in de
termining whether certain legislation is in the public's interest. 62
This author believes that a better provision would read: "A lawyer
52. See infra note 54.
53. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1979).
54. Id.
55. Id.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 192 (1939).
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-101(A)(I) (1979).
58. Id. DR 8-IOI(A)(2).
59. In re Vasser, 75 N.J. 357, 364, 382 A.2d, 114, 117 (1978).
60. Cady, Canons 10 Ihe Code of Professional Responsibility, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222
(1969-1970).
61. Id. at 243-44.
62. Id. at 244.
56.
57.
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who holds public office shall not use his public position for the sole
purpose of advancing in legislative matters the selfish or special in
terests of himself or of a client."63
With this criticism as a starting point, we now will specifically
deal with several of the current dilemmas that face public office
holders who are also private attorneys.

B. Lawyer-Legislator Conflict
1182 64

of Interest:

Informal Opinion

A total of eight questions were posed to the committee, of which
four will be considered. The first was, "Should a lawyer who is a
member of a legislative body accept a retainer or other compensa
tion from an electric utility . . . or any other organization which is
likely to be affected by the passage or defeat of proposed
legislation?"65
In response, the committee found that no definitive answer
could be given because there exists no Disciplinary Rule to prohibit
a lawyer-legislator from representing an individual or organization
that will likely be affected by the passage or defeat of legislation. 66
The committee did find that Disciplinary Rule 8-101(A)(3) may
effectively proscribe the acceptance of a retainer because fact issues
may show that an offered retainer may be made with the purpose of
influencing the lawyer-legislator's action as a public official. The
committee then quoted DR 8-101(A)(l), which prohibits a lawyer
legislator from using his position to attempt to obtain a special advan
tage for himself or for a client in legislative matters where such ac
tion is not in the public interest. 67
The terms "special advantage" and "not in the public interest"
are not defined but a blanket prohibition was not intended because
the committee that drafted the Code did not (although it easily could
have) prohibit a lawyer-legislator from representing a client who is
likely to be affected by the passage or defeat of proposed legisla
tion. 68 Further, an interpretation that constituted a blanket proscrip
tion would leave the lawyer-legislator with very few clients whom he
could represent. The committee construed the phrase "special ad
63.
64.
(1972).
65.
66.
67.
68.

lei.
ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182
lei.
lei.
lei.
lei.
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vantage" to mean a direct and peculiar advantage, and "not in the
public interest" to mean an action that is clearly inimical to the pub
lic's interest. 69 E.C. 8-8 70 was quoted to support the proposition that
a lawyer should refuse a retainer if, considering all circumstances,
the lawyer's conduct will adversely affect public confidence. 71
The commission proceeded to consider the question: "Where
the compensation of members of administrative boards is fixed by
the legislature, or where their appointments are subject to legislative
approval or where they are elected by the legislature, should lawyer
legislators appear before these administrative boards in behalf of
private clients?"72
The commission recognized the proscription of DR 8-101(A)(2)
for a lawyer to use his public position to influence a tribunal to act
either in his behalf or in favor of his client.7 3 Further, the Commis
sion found that a lawyer's mere appearance before such a board may
be circumstantial evidence of using such influence or the attempt
thereof.74 Ultimately, this will be a question of fact that must be
dealt with on a case by case basis.
The commission continued with a further question: "Is it
proper for a lawyer-legislator to accept legal employment by the
state or by one of its agencies?"75 While no Disciplinary Rule could
be found to prohibit a legislator from being employed in such a ca
pacity, the commission concluded that such dual employment is
often controlled by locallaw. 76 Moreover, EC 8-4 provides that this
type of dual employment requires the lawyer clearly to state his posi
tion, pro or con, concerning individual legislation taken by him as a
legislator or as a state employee. 77
Finally, the last question asked if the same rules apply to a law
partner of the legislator-Iawyer. 78 The general rule is that disqualifi
cation of a lawyer includes disqualification of his law partners. 79 It
69. Id.
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 8-8 (1979).
71. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182
( 1972).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 33
(1931), cited in Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The Canons o.f Ethics and
Intra-Firm Conflicts o.f Interest, 73 YALE L.J. 1058, 1078 (1964).
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was the opinion of the commission that the same rules will apply to a
law partner of the legislator. so
C.

State Conflict-of-lnterest Legis/ation

In 1971, Connecticut passed a conflict of interest statute, that
was perceived as "land-mark" legislation. sl For the first time, at
least in the New England region, a state legislature probed the
financial holdings of its members and accepted the responsibility of
defining proper conduct. There was one main weakness in the 1971
statute which became apparent as other states began to pass similar
legislation. David Ogle, Executive Director of the General Assem
bly's Legislative Management Committee, said, "By 1977 we recog
nized that our land-mark conflict-of-interest statute was weak and
ineffective."s2 Thus the General Assembly amended this law so that
financial information pertaining to all legislators was not only open
to public inspection, but was in the hands of the members of an eth
ics commission which was empowered to act on violations and initi
ate sanctions.
1.

Connecticut

Connecticut's Code of Ethics for public officials is codified in
the Connecticut General Statutes. S3 The relevant statute provides
that all statewide elected officials must file, under a penalty of false
statement, a statement for the preceding year. 84 This statement must
include the following: (1) the names of all businesses with which the
officeholder is associated; (2) all sources of income in excess of
$1,000, and all clients who provide over $5,000 of income; (3) the
name of any securities which have a fair market value in excess of
$5,000 unless the stock is held in trust established for the purpose of
divesting the officeholder of all control and knowledge of his assets
in order to avoid a conflict of interest; and (4) all real property and
its location. 85
80. ABA Comm'n on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1182
(1972). Two committee members did not participate in the opinion because of the vague
ness of the inquiry. Id.
81. David Ogle, Executive Director of the Legislative Management Committee of
Connecticut's General Assembly, was the architect for much of the state's modernized
structures and procedures. Prior to 1977, he had custody of sealed confidential informa
tion pertaining to each legislator. Interview with David Ogle (Jan. II, 1983).
82. Id.
83. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-79 through 1-90 (1981).
84. Id. § 1-83(a).
85. Id. § 1-83(b)(\ )(A)-(D).
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In addition, the officeholder must file with the commission a
disclosure of any fees or honorariums received for any appearance
or the delivery of an address before an organization or a meeting. 86
The filed statement is a matter of public information. 87 Moreover, a
public official cannot be offered or given anything of value based on
an understanding that the official's judgment, action, or vote will be
infl uenced. 88
For the purposes of this discussion, the most important portion
of the Code is the section that prohibits a public official from engag
ing in outside activities or incurring any obligation which is in "sub
stantial conflict with the proper discharge of his duties or
employment in the public interest and of his responsibilities as pre
scribed in the laws of this state."89 Under this provision, no public
official may accept other employment which will impair his or her
independence of judgment in the role as a public official. 90
Similar to provisions in Rhode Island General Laws,91 and a
Rhode Island Advisory Opinion,92 Connecticut's statutes forbid a
public official from deriving a direct monetary gain or suffering a
direct monetary loss because of official activity.93 The procedures
required for a public official when a discharge of the duty affects his
or her financial interests are nearly identical in Connecticut and
Rhode Island. 94
Upon finding a violation of the Connecticut statutes, the com
mission is empowered to order the violator to do any or all of the
following: "(1) cease and desist the violation; (2) file any report,
statement or other information as required by the statute; and
(3) pay a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars for
each violation of the statute."95
Moreover, one who intentionally violates any provision of the
statute will be imprisoned for a term not to exceed one year or fined
a sum not to exceed $1,000. 96 Finally, the penalties prescribed limit
neither the power of the legislature to impeach or discipline public
86.

87.
88.
89.

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

95.
96.

Id § 1-83(b)(2).
Id § 1-83(c).
Id § 1-84(1).
Id § 1-84(a).
Id § 1-84(b).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-6 (Supp. 1982).
Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 77-9 (April 19, 1977).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-85 (1981).
Id § 1-86 (1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS §36-14-5 (Supp. 1982).
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1-88(a) (1981).
Id § 1-89(a).
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officials nor the power of any agency or commission to discipline its
. own employees or officials. 97
2.

Rhode Island

In 1977, the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations
followed Connecticut's lead and passed what was considered a
"strong" conflict-of-interest statute. 98 However, unlike Connecticut,
where a state's attorney has prosecuted a lawyer-legislator for ethical
and criminal violations, Rhode Island's Conflict-of-Interest Com
mission "has not received any conflict-of-interest complaints regard
ing attorneys misusing their public office for personal gain."99 This
means the Rhode Island statute has never been tested in an actual
court case. This is not to imply, however, that the commission has
been inactive during the period from 1977 to the present. In addi
tion to issuing over 700 advisory opinions on questions raised by
candidates and elected officials, some of whom were .lawyers, the
commission has processed 123 complaints related to failure to file
required information (only one involved a lawyer-politician).lOo
Because Rhode Island's conflict-of-interest law so closely resem
bles the Connecticut statute, it does not merit further analysis. Bet
ter insights can be gained by reviewing selected advisory opinions
issued by the commission.
(a)

Advisory Opinion 81-13 101

Representative A is both a member of the State House of Rep
resentatives and is an attorney. He learned that he may be able to
serve as counsel for the Bay Commission, an incorporated state au
thority. Representative A had introduced a bill requiring the Bay
Commission to have its rates reviewed by the Public Utilities Com
mission before being asked to perform legal services. 102 The com
mission considered the question whether the attorney-representative
can provide legal services to the Bay Commission. l03
97. Id § 1-89(b).
98. R.t. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-8(k) (Supp. 1982). Telephone interviews with David
Ogle and members of Rhode Island's Conflict-of-Interest Commission (Jan. 1983).
99. Letter from Gerald A. Slattery, Conflict-of-Interest Commission, to Clyde D.
McKee, Jr. (October 8, 1982).
100. Telephone interview with research assistant at Conflict-of-Interest Commis
sion (J an. 1983).
101. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-13 (Apr. 23,
1981).
102. Id
103. Id
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In its advisory opinion, the commission determined that repre
sentative A may perform legal services for the Bay Comm~ssion so
long as he does not vote on or influence directly or indirectly any
General Assembly matters which specifically affect the Bay Commis
sion. I04 Since under House Rules, the sponsor of legislation must
request that the bill be brought up for consideration and vote, Rep
resentative A may make this request. Finally, Representative A's
partners should avoid all activities from which Representative A
himself is prohibited. lOS
(b)

Advisory Opinion 81-9106

Representative B is an associate on salary with a law firm. She
does not share in the profits or expenses. She is a candidate for the
City Council but now must anticipate how her law firm and practice
will be affected. The law firm appears before the City Zoning Board
often and occasional appearances are made before the City Council
for liquor license applications, transfers, and zoning amendments. 107
The commission examined the consequences of her election.
Here, the commission ruled that if Attorney B is elected, any
firm member appearing before the City Council would be in viola
tion of Rhode Island General Laws l08 even if B disqualifies herself
from participation. lo9 The firm may appear before other municipal
agencies provided that: (1) B does not participate in or vote on any
matter before the Town Council in which she or any firm member
has been personally involved; and (2) B abstains from any matter
before the Town Council involving municipal agencies in which she,
or any firm member, continues to practice after B is elected. I 10 Fi
nally, B is advised that if elected, she should request advice as indi
vidual situations arise since all potential conflicts cannot be
anticipated. III
104.
105.
106.
1981).
107.
108.
109.
1981).
110.
111.

Id
Id
Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Ope 81-9 (Feb. 18,
Id
R.l. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4(e)(l) (Supp. 1982).
Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-9 (Feb. 18,
Id
ld
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Advisory Opinion 81-2 as Amended I 12

Attorney C is a partner in a law firm and his law partner is
Chairman of the City Board of Public Safety. C has been appointed
Labor Relations Administrator by the Mayor. His duties include ne
gotIating collective bargaining agreements for the city's uniformed
police officers. As a private attorney, C has been asked by a long
standing client to represent her in an action brought by the city po
lice. He has agreed to represent her on a pro bono basis. 113 The
issue addressed was whether this agreement was in violation of the
Code,ll4
It was the commission's opinion that C may represent his client
without violating the conflict-of-interest law although the commis
sion noted that an appearance of impropriety within the meaning of
the Code of Professional Responsibility,115 may arise. I 16
(d)· Advisory Opinion 79-73(a) and 79-73(b)117
Representative D practices part-time in a law firm and she is
paid on an hourly basis. A partner in the firm is a candidate for a
State Supreme Court vacancy, which will be filled by the General
Assembly. Can D support, campaign or vote for the partner? I 18
The commission found that Representative D may vote or make
a supporting statement for the partner and may actively campaign
for him without violating the conflict-of-interest law. 119
(e)

Advisory Opinion 79-8 120

E is a member of the Finance Committee of the City Council.
He is a partner in a law firm that often represents a company that.
now seeks approval from the Finance Committee of an agreement
between the company and city relating to tax payments, litigation
and real estate. The company has retained another firm with which
112. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-2 as amended
(Feb. 26, 1981).
113. Id
114. Id
115. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1980).
116. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 81-2 as amended
(Feb. 26, 1981).
117. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-73(a), (b) (Sept.
17, 1979).
118. Id
119. Id
120. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-8 (March 8,
1979).
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E has no connection. 121 The commission considered what would be
appropriate conduct for E.
In this situation, the commission decided that E must abstain
from discussing, voting on, or participating in any way on the agree
ment in order to avoid a potential conflict of interest under Rhode
Island General Laws. 122
(f)

Advisory Opinion 78-92 and 78-95 123

Attorney General-elect F owns 100 shares of a Rhode Island
Public Utility stock. As Attorney General, F will be the legal advi
sor to the Public Utilities Division, which regulates the company. 124
The commission considered what F should do to avoid a conflict of
interest. 125
The Conflict-of-Interest Commission found that it had no pres
ent authority to order divestiture of the stock owned by F. The com
mission did state that a potential conflict of interest would be
actualized when F assumed the office of Attorney General. Thus he
should either divest himself of the stock or place it in a qualified
blind trust as defined in federal statutes. 126
(g)

Advisory Opinion 78-7127

G is a member of the Town Council. The council appoints the
Town Probate Judge. G, in his role as an attorney, represents an
estate presently pending before the Probate Court. Does this situa
tion present a conflict of interest? 128
No conflict of interest was found to exist because the Probate
Judge's term is concurrent with that of the council and Councilman
G will have no opportunity to vote on the present Probate Judge's
position. 129
121.
122.

fd
fd See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-4 (Supp. 1982).

123. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 78-92 & 78-95 (Jan.
22, 1979).
124.
125.

fd
fd
12(i. fd The applicable federal statute which covers the qualified blind trust is the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1828 (codified at 2 U.S.c.

§ 702(e)(3) (Supp. V 1981».
127. Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 78-7 (Apr. 25,
1978).
128.
129.

fd
fd
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Advisory Opinion 77-9 130

House Speaker H is in a law firm in which one of the partners
represents city school committees. Legislation will ultimately come
before the House wherein H must vote upon issues dealing with pub
lic school teachers, teachers' unions, and other matters of vital and
monetary concern to the school committees. 13 I
The commission found that a potential conflict of interest exists
under Rhode Island General Laws when legislation comes before H
or any committee on which he serves, that can cause direct monetary
gain or loss to H, his partners or firm, and result in a benefit or detri
ment to H, his firm or law partners. 132 Under state law,133 therefore,
H is required to: (1) file a sworn statement describing the matter to
the Conflict-of-Interest Commission; (2) deliver a copy of the state
ment to the person who presides over the House in H's absence;
(3) record the statement in the House Journal; and (4) request to be
excused from voting on the matter on which the potential conflict
exists. 134
3.

Massachusetts
(a) State Statutes

In 1962, Massachusetts passed a short conflict-of-interest statute
that had three provisions. 135 First, it restricted state and county em
ployees from receiving directly or indirectly, or requesting compen
sation from anyone outside the government for a matter in which the
government was a party or had "a direct and substantial interest." 136
Second, it made it a crime for anyone to give or promise compensa
tion to a government official to exercise influence. 137 Third, it ex
pressly restricted state-employed attorneys from representing clients
with claims against the government. 138 The penalty for violating
these requirements was not to exceed a fine of $3,000 or a prison
term of two years, or both.139 This statute was revised in 1978, im
130.
1977).
13\.
132.
133.
134.
1977).
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 77-9 (Apr. 19,
Id
Id; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-6 (Supp. 1982).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-14-5.
Rhode Island Conflict-of-Interest Comm'n, Advisory Op. 79-9 (Apr. 19,
MASS. GEN.
Id § II(a).
Id § II(b).
Id § II(c).
Id

LAWS

ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 1-25 (West 1970).
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posing restrictions on legal partners of lawyers in the employment of
the Commonwealth. 140 It also imposed a one-year restriction on
lawyer-legislators from acting as "legislative agents" for parties
outside the government under threat of fine and imprisonment. 141
Added insights into the legal theory of the Commonwealth's
conflict-of-interest laws can be gained by reviewing the following ad
visory opinion.
(b)

Advisory Opinion 82-6 142

The committee considered the following situation. A legislator
(L) wants to practice law part-time with two friends. The proposed
firm would attract clients whose needs would require the firm to go
before federal, state, and local administrative authorities. The law
yers would be appearing in settings for formal adjudication, rule
making, and negotiations for permits and licenses. L wants to know
what his limitations are as a lawyer-Iegislator. 143
The committee determined that the lawyer would not be sub
jected to duties to the Commonwealth under Canons 4 and 5. 144 De
spite this, it may give rise to fiduciary duties to the commonwealth
which may be compromised by his representation of private con
cerns against the Commonwealth. The committee provided that
such fiduciary duties are matters of substantive law which it cannot
address. 145 Similarly, the committee determined that application of
Massachusetts statutes 146 to a public official's representation of pri
vate clients is equally beyond its purview. 147
The committee did find Massachusetts law 148 imposing stringent
restrictions upon a legislator's legal representation of private individ
uals in front of state agencies when the legislator is being compen
140. Id § 5(d)( Supp. 1980).
141. Id § 5(e) (Supp. 1980).
142. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
1982). It should be understood that this opinion is not a state ethics ruling, but an
advisory opinion by the committee of a voluntary association.
143. Id
144. Id Canon 4 states: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of
a client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1979). Canon 5
states: "A lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a cli
ent." Id Canon 5.
145. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
1982).
146. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, §§ 1-25 (West 1970).
147. Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
1982).
148. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 268A, § 4 (West 1970).
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sated. 149 Moreover, the State Ethics Commission has proposed to
amend the state statute to further restrict such representation. 150
The committee then found that DR 8-101(A)(2)151 would be ap
plicable in situations in which the lawyer goes before certain federal
and local governmental entities. 152 This was interpreted as a viola
tion only when the lawyer uses his influence, as opposed to using his
public position per se. 153 The committee found that DR 9-101(c)154
wmild prohibit a lawyer from stating or implying that he is able to
influence the action of any entity of government in an improper
manner. 155 Finally, the committee stated that the lawyer-legislator's
partners would not be barred from practicing in front of governmen
tal agencies. 156 While such partners obviously could not state or im
ply that they may be able to influence the agency because of their
partnership with the lawyer-legislator, this does not mean that 'a total
bar is appropriate. 157 The committee warned, however, that the law
yer-legislator cannot be involved in a matter engaged in by one of
his partners, if the legislator himself could not handle it personally;
nor may the legislator's compensation be affected by the firm's han
dling of the matter. 15S
IV.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF NATIONAL AND STATE CONFLICT OF
INTEREST LEGISLATION AND ADVISORY OPINIONS

What have been the consequences of the national and state re
form movements initiated during the past two decades? Are fewer
lawyers running for public office, particularly legislative seats at the
state and local levels? If so, are legislatures becoming more repre
sentative of the general population? To what extent has the adop
tion of stringent conflict-of-interest statutes influenced the policies of
major law firms? How have these statutes influenced the behavior of
149.
1982).
ISO.
lSI.
152.
1982).
153.
154.
ISS.
1982).
156.
157.
158.

Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982, at I, col. I.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 8-IOI(A)(2) (1979).
Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
Id
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 9-IOI(c) (1979).
Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Op. 82-6 (May 6,
Id
Id
Id
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lawyer-politicians who are serving in state and local legislatures?
Are additional reforms necessary?
Occupational surveys showing the percentages of lawyers serv
ing in state legislatures have been compiled by organiz~tions suc~ as
the Insurance Information Institute (1.1.1.).159 This institute's occu
pational survey for the New England region is reproduced in Appen
dix A. Similar national information was first compiled in 1966,
facilitating a framework for the analysis of the impact of conflict-of
interest legislation. The Institute's findings concerning the role of
lawyers are summarized below.
A.

Entire United States: Comparison

of 1979 with Previous

Years

Generally, representation by lawyers in the state legislatures
across the nation is continuing to decline, and the percentage of state
lawmakers from the field of education is on the rise. 160 The latest
survey, in 1979, shows that lawyers hold 20% of the state legislative
seats countrywide, down from 21% in 1977 and 22% in 1976. This
represents a decrease of 106 seats since 1977; 188 seats since 1976. 161
In 1966, when the I.I.I. first conducted an occupational study, 26% of
all state lawmakers were lawyers. 162
B.

Major Regional Areas

The percentage of state legislators who are also attorneys is
down in each of the nation's four major geographical areas. Only in
the South does the percentage (29%) exceed that for the total U.S.
Virginia has the highest percentage of lawyer-legislators (53%) of
any state. At the other end of the spectrum, Delaware has the only
legislature with no lawyers among its members. Lawyers hold 30%
or more of the legislative seats in each of 7 states; in 1977, it was 11.
On the other hand, the number of states in which lawyers hold 15%
or fewer of the legislative seats now stands at 20, up from 18 in
1977. 163
159. See, e.g., INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (1979).
160. See infra Appendix A.
16\. Id.
162. INSURANCE INFORMATION
LEGISLATURES 8 (1979).
163. See page 69\.

INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF STATE
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of 1979 with Previous

In 1979, in each of the three urban-industrial states in New Eng
land, more than 1 of every 5 legislators were lawyers: Massachusetts,
25%; Rhode Island, 23%; and Connecticut, 21 %. By contrast, in the
three rural New England states, fewer than 1 of 10 state legislators
were attorneys: Maine, 9%; Vermont, 8%; and New Hampshire,
3%.164

D. Implications
This information supports the hypothesis that conflict-of-inter
est statutes initiated at the national and state levels during the past
REPRESENTATION BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS,
1979, 1977 AND 1976
- TOTAL U.S. 
Total U.S.

Northeast

North Central

South

West

20%
21%
22%

17%
18%
19%

16%
17%
18%

29%
31%
32%

12%
13%
14%

La~ers

1979
1977
1976

Id.
164.
REPRESENTATION BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS,
1979, 1977 AND 1976

- NEW ENGLAND 
Regional
Total

Conn.

Maine

Mass.

N.H.

R.I.

Vt.

12%
12%
13%

21%
19%
23%

9%
6%
7%

25%
24%
24%

3%
2%
2%

23%
24%
27%

8%
8%
8%

La~ers

1979
1977
1976

REPRESENTATION BY LAWYERS, INSURANCE PEOPLE AND EDUCATORS
IN 1979, SENATES AND HOUSES
- NEW ENGLAND 
Regional
Total

Conn.

Maine

Mass.

N.H.

R.I.

Vt.

25%
10%

47%
15%

9%
9%

35%
22%

4%
2%

26%
22%

20%
5%

La~ers

Senate
House
Id. at 12.
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two decades may be causal factors in discouraging lawyers from
service in state legislatures. As the percentages of attorneys declined,
the percentages of other groups (educators, women, minorities, etc.)
have increased, making legislatures more representative of the gen
eral population. 165
The three-year survey of percentages of attorneys in the New
England states suggest that this region has a trend that runs counter
to the trend of the nation. Over this three-year period, the percent
age for the New England region declined only a single point. 166
There were ·actual increases in the percentages of attorneys serving in
four of the six states between 1977 and 1979. 167 Only in Rhode Is
land has there been a steady decline, while the percentage of lawyer
legislators in Vermont remained a constant 8%.168 But more impor
tant than these small deviations is the glaring fact that in three states
(Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) each legislature has
more than one-fifth lawyer-legislators while in the remaining three
states (Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont) each has less than
one-tenth lawyer-legislators. 169 A possible explanation may be that
the high-percentage states tend to be "commuter-legislator" states.
However, one lawyer, who practices in Vermont and teaches at the
University of Connecticut, said, "We have higher legal standards in
Vermont than in Connecticut. We would not tolerate what goes on
in the Connecticut Probate Courts." 170 This statement suggests there
may be significant differences in the political cultures of the more
rural states which affect the incentive-rewards systems of their law
yer-politicians.
V.

DIVERSITY OF POLICY IN LAW FIRMS FOR
LAWYER- POLITICIANS

Law firms in Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts can
be grouped into six major categories. First, there are the large law
firms located in capital cities. These firms are primarily interested in
the practice of law and will not allow any of their members to serve
as state representatives. Second, there are large law firms that facili
165. Id
166. Id at 9.
167. These increases occurred in Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire. See supra note 164.
168. Rhode Island declined from 27% to 23% between 1976 and 1979. Vermont
remained steady at 8%. Id
169. Id
170. See supra note 16.
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tate, if not encourage, their members to seek elected statewide execu
tive offices and national appointments. They allow their lawyer
politicians to take leaves of absence and remain associated with the
firm, providing a "castle" to which the lawyer-politicians can return
if oefeated or retired. Third, there are smaller law firms, located
outside the capital regions which do not object to their members
serving in the state legislature or in other elected and appointed posi
tions. Fourth, there are small firms which encourage their members
to seek positions on partisan committees, town councils, and to serve
as town counselor judges of probate. Fifth, there are firms which
facilitate if not encourage their members to take active roles in such
partisan activities as fundraising and campaigns but prohibit their
holding of elected or appointed office. Finally, there is the "political
law firm."171
In Connecticut, at least, "political law firms" are offices com
posed of prominent ex-political officials. They have held leadership
positions and run for public office. Democrats and Republicans oc
cupy these law offices which are designed to provide high class state
lobbying services for affluent corporations and interest groups.
There are such firms in Connecticut which exercise substantial polit
ical influence at the national, state, or local levels. 172
At the other end of the spectrum are those law firms not inter
ested in having their members participate in politics. Law students
at Harvard are instructed on how to approach many of the Boston
firms: "Tell the representatives of these firms that you have always
wanted to work for their particular firm, that you only want to prac
tice law, and that you want to spend your entire career with
them."173 The theory for this advice is that the senior partners in
these firms see their organizations strictly as business enterprises
designed to make money rather than serving the public's interest by
participating in the political process. 174
Some large law firms in Connecticut try to strike a more bal
anced position. While they have restrictions on members serving in
the state legislature because they represent major clients regulated by
state agencies, they will facilitate the election of members of the firm
to the office of mayor or city council even though service in these
positions costs the firm thousands of dollars in legal fees from clients
171.
172.
173.
who was
174.

Id
Id
This information was supplied by a recent Harvard Law School graduate,
hired by a Boston firm. Id
Id
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with zoning and tax problems. One senior partner in such. a firm
explained that there was a need for his firm to have an enlightened
and expansive concept of social and civic responsibility. He also
said conflict-of-interest statutes, advisory opinions of the bar associa
tions, and the threat of perceived ethical and legal conflicts are a
constant source of frustration in the firm's practice of law. 175
Rhode Island has few, if any, large law firms which can equal
the size of those in Massachusetts or Connecticut. Although Rhode
Island has a strict conflict-of-interest statute, there is a general per
ception by both lawyers and non-lawyers that this law imposes few
restrictions on lawyer-politicians, who wish to serve as public or
elected officials.I 76 The fact that there have been no official com
plaints involving lawyer-politicians supports this generalization.
VI.

QUESTIONS, ISSUES, AND GUIDELINES FOR
FURTHER REFORMS

A.

Recent Changes

In February 1982, the Massachusetts State Ethics Commission
announced that it was proposing "a comprehensive legislative pack
age" to amend the state conflict-of-interest law (Chapter 268A).177
Similarly, in Connecticut, the state's legislative Codes of Ethics
Study Committee announced in January 1983 that it was going to
recommend "tighter state codes."17s
In both states there is general agreement among lawyers, mem
bers of the press, and those who administer the conflict-of-interest
statutes that their law is "basically sound."179 The Massachusetts
State Ethics Commission saw the need, however, to loosen the re
strictions against "special" public employees and state legislators
"from receiving compensation for appearing before quasi-judicial
proceedings of state agencies," particularly the Industrial Accident
Board. lso Connecticut's Code of Ethics Study Committee was cre
ated in 1982 after a scandal involving a dozen legislators, who were
Id
Id
177. Conjlicl Amendmenrs Proposed, Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982,
at I, col. 4.
178. Elhics Panel Asks Tighler Slale Codes, The Hartford Courant, Jan. 18, 1983,
at 13.
179. Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, Feb. 8, 1982, at I, col. 4.
180. Id
175.
176.
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treated to a weekend on Cape Code by a lobbyist for a dog track.I 81
There is strong sentiment in Connecticut that more top govern
ment policy makers should be required to wait at least a year before
taking jobs with businesses they have regulated. 182 One recommen
dation calls for lobbyists to be required to report campaign contribu
tions exceeding $50.00. 183 Another would require lobbyists to
disclose the names of any officials they employ.184 There is also a
provision that calls for the Ethics Commission to be given the au
thority to refuse to accept, for a period of two years, the registration
of any lobbyist found guilty of "a serious, intentional, violation of
the ethics law."185
B.

Unanswered Questions

There are other issues that law-makers and political leaders in
the New England states may want to consider. First, to what extent
should the structures, requirements, and procedures of government
be designed to facilitate public service by lawyers as elected and ap
pointed officials? Second, there is a need to recognize that the be
havior of lawyers is now regulated by state statutes, rulings of the
ethics commissions, advisory opinions of bar associations, the inter
nal policies oflaw firms, and the character and ethical values of indi
vidual practitioners.
Which of these should have primary
responsibility for maintaining high standards of legal conduct?
Third, is the public better served by part-time, citizen-politicians,
some of whom are lawyers, or should the system be changed to at
tract only those persons interested in becoming full-time profession
als; whether' they be local judges, city solicitors, city councilmen,
state prosecutors, state legislators, state's attorney generals, or gover
nors? Fourth, when conflicts of interest arise, how should they be
handled? Should these issues be raised by opposing counsel, by fel
low members of commissions, boards, committees, and legislative
bodies, or by the lawyer directly involved? Who should decide if an
actual conflict exists: the attorney general and city solicitor; other
members of the political body; or the lawyer himself? Fifth, when a
lawyer-politician is guilty of a serious and intentional conflict of in
terest, who should have primary responsibility for punishment: the
181.
(Jan. II,
182.
183.
184.
185.

Interview with Charles Morse. Political Reporter for The Hartford Courant
1983).
The Hartford Courant, Jan. 18, 1983, at 13.
Id
Id
Id
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political party; the political body to which the member belongs; the
bar association; the state licensing board; or the press and media?
C. Implementation

of Solutions

There are a variety of structural options, salary incentives, for
mal and informal rewards, election provisions, and in-house rules
that can be used to implement answers to the general questions.
Space limitations will permit discussion of only several of these
alternatives.
At the local level many lawyer-politicians are discouraged from
running for seats on the city council due to potential conflicts of in
terest. When city councils have authority to rule on zoning issues,
appeals from tax requirements, and suits against the municipality, all
the members of the councilman's law firm are prohibited from repre
senting clients with problems in these areas. 186 The city charter can
be changed to empower the city council to decentralize and delegate
its authority to remove potential conflicts of interest. Special atten
tion can be given to the office of director of law or city solicitor. If
this official is a full-time, permanent employee, with authority to act
on suits against the city, then potential conflicts of interest for law
yer-councilmen are reduced significantly.
Similarly, if lawyers are appointed by the chief executives to
commissions, boards, and committees rather than elected or ap
pointed by the city council, the number of potential conflicts can be
reduced for both the councilman and the appointed attorney. In
general, there is a need for members of charter commissions to see
governmental structures and procedures as incentives-rewards sys
tems, which have a direct influence on attracting or discouraging
lawyer-politicians.
VII.

CONCLUSION

There is an enduring affinity between the practice of law and
the practice of politics in America. There are also enduring issues
and problems of actual and perceived conflicts of interest for lawyer
politicians. During the past two decades the American Bar Associa
tion' state legislatures, and ethics commissions have initiated a vari
ety of restrictions to check unacceptable behavior by legislators,
lobbyists, and permanent employees. There appears to be a national
relationship between the introduction of these restrictions and a de
186. See supra note 16.
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cline in the numbers of lawyer-legislators. The New England region
provides an interesting and challenging environment to study the op
portunities, incentives-rewards, and conflict-of-interest problems of
lawyer-politicians. Although there are a variety of proposals for
modifying existing conflict-of-interest statutes, many of the funda
mental issues affecting lawyers who want to participate in public
service have yet to be adequately addressed. Once they are ad
dressed, the political institutions at the state and local levels lend
themselves to a variety of options and alternatives for facilitating the
compatible practice of law and politics.
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APPENDIX A
NEW ENGLAND
REGION
OCCUPATIONS OF STATE LEGISLATORSI87
(Percentages by State)
Regional
Total

Conn.

Maine

Mass.

N.H.

R.I.

VI.

1,325

187

184

200

424

150

180

%

%

%

%

%

%

%

Lawyer
Other Professionals
Insurance
Entrepreneur/Self-Employed
Business Executive/Managerial

12%
8
6
17
6

21%
6
7
14
9

9%
5
4
22
5

25%
7
7
13
3

3%
12
4
16
5

23%
7
9
21
4

8%
7
6
\3
9

Real Estate/Construction
Agriculture
Communications/Arts
Other Business Occupations
Education

8
5
3
II
\0

4
2
3
6
9

Government Employees
Non-Profit Organizations
Labor Union
Homemaker/Student
Information Not Available

6
I

5
3

6
I

6
5

NUMBER OF LEGISLATORS

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY

12
9
19
7
3
I
3

5

\0

8

I
5
13

4
5
14
8

6
14

\0
I
I

\0

9

9

4

•
•
•

8
16
3
10
13

5
I

2

• Less than \2 of 1%.

187.

INSURANCE iNFORMATION INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF STATE

LEGISLATURES

43 (1979).

